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EVALUATING INSTRUMENTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:  A COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR RICHARDS
NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In his article, “Framing Environmental Policy Instrument
Choice,” 1 Professor Richards proposes a taxonomy of environmental
policy instruments as a guide in drawing comparisons between the in-
struments.  His logical apparatus provides a useful framework for or-
ganizing environmental policies and offers a measure of insight about
the relationships among them.  Professor Richards is less successful,
however, in evaluating the policy instruments, largely because of his
attempt to apply transaction cost economics to environmental policy.
In this Comment, I discuss four points in turn.  First, Professor
Richards frames his discussion in terms of a stylized cost-
minimization problem.  Although a useful first step, his presentation
of the problem as a static one limits his evaluation of the policy in-
struments with respect to the dynamic effects on technological
change.  Framing the problem in explicitly dynamic terms suggests
several ways in which the cost components and even the constraints
of the problem change over time.
Second, Professor Richards draws a distinction between policy
instruments that require payment from polluters to the government
and those that do not.  He argues that whether or not private firms
pay for their emissions determines who bears the burden of environ-
mental damages, and he returns to this distinction in evaluating the
instruments on the grounds of “equity and environmental justice.”
This discussion, however, confuses the incentive properties of emis-
sions payments with equity considerations.  Such payments do not
compensate the victims of pollution; indeed, they are not necessarily
even equal to the damages from pollution.
* Ph.D. Candidate, Political Economy and Government, Harvard University.
1. Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221 (2000).
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Third, Professor Richards overlooks an important class of policy
instruments:  ambient taxes and emissions permits.  Indeed, the dis-
tinction Professor Richards makes between controlling inputs and
controlling outputs can be extended to the choice of the “locus of
regulation”—that is, at what stage to regulate, along the chain from
inputs to emissions to eventual environmental damages.
Finally, Professor Richards devotes considerable attention to
what he calls the “governance costs” associated with implementing
environmental policy instruments.  Here he draws heavily on transac-
tion cost economics, particularly the work of Oliver Williamson.  Ar-
guing that the conditions of uncertainty and asset specificity apply
equally well to the environmental policy arena as to contractual rela-
tionships between private parties, Professor Richards concludes that,
in some cases, market-based policy instruments may invite govern-
ment opportunism, raising their true social costs and leading to a
preference for command-and-control regulation.
However, it is by no means clear that the environmental policy
arena is analogous to the contractual setting envisioned by the trans-
action cost theorists.  The examples provided by Professor Richards
are better illustrations of a cost-revelation problem than the “hold-
up” problem that is the focus of the transaction cost literature.  I sug-
gest a hypothetical hold-up problem in environmental policy and ar-
gue that its relevance rests on special assumptions about the regula-
tor’s treatment of firms, which do not generally apply to market-
based instruments.  Moreover, even to the extent that “governance
costs” arise in environmental regulation, hierarchical control is un-
likely to represent a solution.
II.  THE COST-MINIMIZATION PROBLEM
Economic theory is much more comfortable describing efficiency
than equity: the former criterion mobilizes the powerful apparatus of
cost-benefit analysis, while the latter involves the messy complica-
tions of interpersonal comparisons.  In evaluating environmental
policy instruments, therefore, economists have tended to give greatest
weight to efficiency concerns—or, in the absence of information on
benefits, to cost-effectiveness concerns.  Professor Richards follows
suit.  He proposes the following cost-minimization problem as a
starting point for evaluating policy instruments:
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Minimize (PC + IC + TX)
Subject to the following constraints:
Pollution abatement requirement
Legal constraints
Political constraints.2
In his formulation, PC denotes “production costs,” or the costs of
pollution abatement; IC denotes “implementation costs,” notably
monitoring costs and what Professor Richards terms “governance
costs”; and TX denotes public finance impacts, or the deadweight loss
from environmental regulation due to pre-existing distortionary
taxes.3
As stated, however, this problem lacks an explicit time dimen-
sion.  To be sure, at certain points in the discussion Professor Ri-
chards recognizes the dynamic aspects of the policy problem.4  But, he
unduly narrows his focus by framing the problem in static terms.
With regard to pollution abatement costs, two dynamic issues
stand out.  First, different policy instruments allow different degrees
of discretion in the timing of pollution abatement.  Indeed, Professor
Richards includes this as the sixth “dimension” of his taxonomy.5
Allowing banking of tradeable emissions permits, for example, gives
polluting firms the flexibility to allocate pollution control efforts
across time as well as space.  In theory, this allows intertemporal cost-
minimization, as firms can equalize marginal abatement costs at dif-
ferent time periods—for example, by banking permits when costs are
low for use later when marginal abatement costs increase (perhaps
due to a reduction in the number of new permits granted by the
regulator).  A shift in emissions from earlier to later periods also en-
hances environmental benefits, since future damages are discounted
relative to present ones.  Both effects of banking, for example, are
apparent in the experience thus far with the tradeable allowances
provision of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.6
A second, and perhaps more important, dynamic element in en-
vironmental policy concerns the effects of policy instrument choice on
the innovation and diffusion of new pollution control technologies.
2. See Richards, supra note 1, at 228.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 228, 248, 255.
5. See id. at 248.
6. See  A. DENNY ELLERMAN, ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM (forthcoming 2000)(manuscript at 58, on file with author).
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Dynamic incentives are presumably especially important for recently-
appearing environmental policy issues, such as global climate change,
that act over long time scales.  A growing body of literature in envi-
ronmental economics (part of which Professor Richards cites) con-
cludes generally that market-based instruments provide greater in-
centives for innovation and diffusion of policy instruments than do
more rigid approaches, such as performance or technology standards,
although the question of efficient incentives for technological change
remains largely an open one, dependent on details such as the form of
the pollution damages function.7  The dynamic effects of policy in-
strument choice on technological change are also implicit in Professor
Richards’ concerns about regulatory opportunism.8
The importance of a dynamic framework also extends to the
other two elements of Professor Richards’ constrained minimization
problem: implementation costs and public finance effects.  Monitor-
ing costs are presumably highest at the beginning of a regulatory ef-
fort: as both the regulator and regulated firms learn about the new
policy and about the technologies used for monitoring and measure-
ment, those costs are likely to fall.  Moreover, the bulk of monitoring
costs may involve capital investments in new devices, such as the Con-
tinuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) used to measure SO2
emissions under the tradeable allowances program.  Thus, the imple-
mentation costs for a particular instrument are likely to vary over
time.  Similarly, “governance costs” may be time-dependent to the ex-
tent that they depend on uncertainty about proper regulatory strin-
gency, the regulator’s preferences, or private abatement costs.9
Finally, one may even view the constraints of Professor Richards’
characteristic problem as essentially dynamic.  The pollution abate-
ment requirement, of course, may vary over time—not only due to
changes (perhaps unforeseen) in preferences or costs, but also as part
of a deliberate and pre-announced gradual reduction of pollution lev-
els or expansion of coverage.  For example, the SO2 tradeable allow-
ances program has been implemented in two phases:  Phase I, begin-
ning in 1995, included only the dirtiest power plants (the largest
7. See, e.g., Paul B. Downing & Lawrence J. White, Innovation in Pollution Control, 13 J.
ENVTL.  ECON. & MGMT.  18 (1986); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to
Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247 (1989);
Carolyn Fischer, et al., Instrument Choice for Environmental Protection When Technological
Change is Endogenous, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 99-04 (1998).
8. These effects are discussed extensively infra Part V.
9. For more on the temporal element to governance costs and a critique of Richards’ ap-
proach, see infra pp. 401, 410-411.
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emitters of sulfur dioxide), while Phase II (beginning in 2000) extends
the program to a much wider universe of polluters.  Moreover, the
number of annual allowances (which can be used any time in or after
their “vintage year”) falls in Phase II, representing a “ratcheting” of
pollution control.
Political and legal constraints may also change—and, impor-
tantly, that change may be endogenous to the choice of instrument.
Casual observation suggests that the past two decades have seen a
relaxation of opposition to market-based instruments.  At least some
of this change of heart might reasonably be ascribed to gradual but
growing experience with such instruments—starting with the emis-
sions trading provisions of earlier incarnations of the Clean Air Act,
continuing with the lead phase-down program of the mid-1980s, and
culminating in the success of the SO2 allowances program.
10  Indeed,
in some sense, political constraints can be seen as a function of the
“stock” of experience with a particular instrument, or class of instru-
ments.  A similar argument could apply to legal constraints.
In place of Professor Richards’ static problem, therefore, we
might better view the representative constrained optimization
problem (minimizing environmental costs, E) in explicitly dynamic
terms:
This formulation expressly recognizes the dynamic aspects dis-
cussed above, including the possible evolution over time of the “po-
litically and legally feasible set,” here denoted by X(t) and assumed to
be a function of politics, legal constraints, experience with various
policy instruments, and so on.  Uncertainty is prominent:  the regula-
tor seeks to minimize the expected costs, given uncertainty.  And the
(social) discount rate δ—itself a product of social deliberation—is
presented explicitly as a parameter of the policy problem.
10. For a related discussion of the importance of the learning curve for the acceptance of
market-based instruments (especially as it relates to legislators), see Nathaniel O. Keohane, et
al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL.. L. REV.
313, 357-63 (1998).
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Professor Richards does not ignore the dynamic aspects of policy
instrument choice in his discussion.  But he integrates these aspects
only in an ad hoc manner.  Incorporating dynamics directly into the
cost-minimization problem reveals the range of ways in which both
the costs and the constraints of environmental regulation vary over
time, in part as a function of accumulated experience and past regula-
tion.
III.  POLLUTER PAYMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
The organizing theme of Professor Richards’ taxonomy is the
degree of government involvement in pollution control, along a range
of relevant dimensions.  One such dimension is the “distribution of
abatement and environmental damage costs.”11  Professor Richards
argues that policy instruments differ not only by the extent to which
private polluters pay the costs of abatement, but also by the extent to
which those polluters bear the damages from pollution.  He has in
mind policies, such as auctioned tradeable permits or emissions taxes,
that require polluters to pay for their emissions.  In his conclusion, he
returns to this issue, arguing that “the distinction between abatement
costs and residual environmental damages emphasizes the issues of
equity and fairness inherent in deciding who bears these two types of
costs.”12
The connection between payments by polluters and distribu-
tional equity is tenuous for two reasons.  First, emissions payments
need not equal environmental damages.  Second, and more funda-
mentally, payments by polluters do not represent compensation to the
victims of pollution.  To see the first point, consider a zero-baseline
emissions tax (the same principles apply directly to a system of auc-
tioned tradeable permits).  Suppose that the costs of pollution are de-
scribed by an upward-sloping marginal damages function, and sup-
pose (perhaps due to political constraints, or imperfect knowledge of
the marginal damages function) that the regulator is restricted to us-
ing a linear tax—one for which the tax on any given unit of pollution
is constant.  Then the tax payment from the regulated industry will
exceed the damages from pollution.  This simple result is illustrated in
Figure 1, which plots marginal pollution damages against marginal
(industry) abatement costs.  Given a tax on emissions equal to P,
polluters (in the aggregate) emit Q units of emissions (the level at
11. Richards, supra note 1, at 237.
12. See id. at 282.
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which aggregate marginal abatement costs equal the tax).  Total envi-
ronmental damages are given by the area of the triangle OAQ, and
total tax revenue by rectangle OPAQ.  Of course, in the special case
where marginal damages are constant, the tax payments and damages
from pollution coincide, but such agreement occurs only by the acci-
dent of the damages function.13
Whether or not the tax payment happens to equal pollution
damages, however, the victims of pollution do not necessarily receive
compensation.  Indeed, economic theory suggests that Pareto opti-
mality requires that victims not be compensated—at least, not in pro-
portion to the damages they suffer.  Any compensation paid to the
victims must be lump-sum, rather than a function of the damages
borne.14  Rather than serving to “punish” polluters and compensate
victims, emissions payments provide an incentive to reduce emissions
by attaching a price to pollution on the margin.  Because every pol-
luter faces the same marginal tax rate, they independently choose
abatement levels at which their marginal abatement costs are equal,
satisfying a necessary condition for cost-effectiveness.  That is, emis-
sions payments encourage an efficient allocation of pollution con-
13. More generally, if marginal damages are known and the regulator can levy a nonlinear
tax, then a tax schedule equal to the marginal damages function will result in tax payments
equal to damages.  But environmental economists typically assume that the complexity of a
nonlinear tax—in particular, the need to know the marginal damages schedule— rules out its
use by the regulator.  Indeed, restricting the regulator to a linear tax (i.e., a constant tax per unit
of emissions) seems particularly fitting in the cost-effectiveness framework provided by Profes-
sor Richards.  The emphasis on cost-effectiveness rather than efficiency presumably reflects an
implicit assumption that the regulator lacks knowledge of the true damages from pollution.
14. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 42-44 (2d ed., 1988).
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trol.15  Distributional equity, on the other hand, would be served by a
distinct program of compensatory payments, which—like other redis-
tributional measures—imposes a cost in efficiency terms.16  From the
point of view of economic theory, making the polluter pay has little to
do with equity and everything to do with efficiency.
Moreover, Professor Richards assumes that taxes and auctioned
permits are revenue-neutral, so that revenues are “recycled” to re-
duce other distortionary taxes.17  Revenue neutrality is inconsistent
with victim compensation: proceeds from an environmental tax can-
not simultaneously reduce distortionary taxes and compensate for
pollution damages.  Compensating the victims, however, would seem
to be central to any notion of “fairness” or “justice” involved in
making polluters pay.  Merely raising the costs to polluters, without
attending to those who suffer from the pollution, would seem a mea-
ger kind of justice.
To clarify the distinction between emissions payments and fair-
ness, consider the following revenue-neutral emissions tax:  polluters
pay a charge on each unit of emissions, and then the tax revenue is re-
turned to the polluting industry in the form of lump-sum payments or
an industry-wide reduction on corporate income taxes.  Such a tax
scheme would be cost-effective and would require polluters to pay on
inframarginal as well as marginal emissions, yet it would not repre-
sent an improvement in “equity” or fairness.  Thus, the mere fact that
firms pay for their emissions has no independent distributional sig-
nificance.
Professor Richards equates a transfer of resources from polluters
to the government as a payment for environmental damages.  But,
consider the implications of this argument for policy instruments,
such as “grandfathered” (i.e., freely allocated) tradeable permits, that
involve transfers from government to polluters.  The value of such a
transfer is equal, in principle, to the amount that polluters would pay
to the government under an otherwise equivalent system of auctioned
permits.  However, one would not conclude that grandfathered per-
mits represent a payment of environmental damages to the polluter.
Such transfers between government and private industry do not affect
the distribution of the environmental damages themselves.
15. If the marginal damages function is known, and the tax or number of permits set ac-
cordingly, these instruments also induce an efficient level of pollution.
16. See generally Sally Holtermann, Alternative Tax Systems to Correct for Externalities,
and the Efficiency of Paying Compensation, 43 ECONOMICA 9 (1976).
17. See Richards, supra note 1, at 241.
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In general, therefore, whether or not polluters pay for their emis-
sions does not affect who bears the actual environmental damages—
the health risks from dirty air, say, or the loss of riparian habitat in
polluted streams.  Regardless of the policy instrument chosen, or the
size of the transfer from private industry to government, those dam-
ages are borne by society.  A compensation scheme would be logically
distinct and could be added equally well to any policy instrument.
Professor Richards would be correct in distinguishing among in-
struments on the basis of whether private industry pays for their
emissions.  But while this distinction is important on efficiency
grounds, it is not significant on the grounds of distributional equity.
IV.  AMBIENT TAXES AND PERMITS AND THE “LOCUS OF
REGULATION”
While he includes most of the major policy instruments in his
taxonomy, and even suggests a few new ones, Professor Richards
overlooks an important class of approaches to environmental policy
that are particularly relevant for pollution control:  ambient taxes and
permits, which are tied to pollution concentrations at specific recep-
tors rather than to emissions.  Under such a system, polluters face a
“price on pollution concentration” resulting from emissions, rather
than a price on emissions.18  While ambient permit systems are largely
of theoretical interest, some scholars have proposed their use in fed-
eral environmental policy in the United States. 19
Under an ambient tax or permit system, the marginal price on
emissions varies among polluters according to their location.  Emis-
sions and pollution concentrations are measured, and polluters pay on
the basis of how their emissions translate into increased pollution
concentrations.  As a result, the marginal costs of reducing pollution
concentrations at the receptors are equalized among polluters,
achieving a cost-effective reduction in pollution concentration.
This discussion relates directly to the fifth dimension of Professor
Richards’ taxonomy, which concerns how polluters’ compliance with
environmental regulation is measured.20  The classic distinction, as Ri-
chards points out, is that between regulating output of pollution di-
18. For a discussion of ambient permit systems in particular, see generally Thomas  H.
TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE  IN REFORMING  POLLUTION POLICY
(1985).
19. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PENN. L. REV. 2341, 2410-2416 (1996).
20. See Richards, supra note 1, at 247.
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rectly, and regulating the inputs to the production process that create
the pollution.  In both cases, the regulator is interested in the actual
pollution output, rather than the inputs used; but the performance in-
dicator differs.  Professor Richards adopts a wider view, framing the
issue not just in terms of inputs and outputs, but in terms of the “de-
gree of correlation between the performance indicator and the de-
sired outcome.” 21 The choice of whether to regulate at the level of in-
puts or outputs, however, involves a tradeoff.  As a general rule, we
might suppose input controls, such as a tax on the sulfur content of
coal, to be easier to administer than controls on emissions: the regula-
tor needs only to track the coal burned by the power plant, rather
than the more elusive flue gases escaping from the stacks.  On the
other hand, regulating inputs rather than pollution restricts the scope
of the polluter’s discretion in limiting pollution.  If “end-of-pipe”
emissions reduction is cheaper than altering inputs, an input regula-
tion will raise the costs of abatement.22
We can extend this reasoning further by drawing on the concepts
of ambient taxes or permits. Just as the appropriateness of an input-
based regulation depends on the correlation between inputs and
emissions, so the appropriateness of an emissions-based regulation
depends on the correlation between emissions and environmental
damages.  In particular, the extent to which pollutant emissions from
different sources are nonuniformly mixed—so that emissions from
different sources have different impacts on the environment—deter-
mines how suitable an instrument focused on emissions is, compared
to one based on ambient concentrations.23
Ultimately, the “desired outcome” of pollution control policy is
not a reduction in pollution emissions (or even aggregate emissions),
any more than it is a reduction in inputs to polluting processes.
Rather, the desired outcome is a reduction in environmental damages,
whether that implies damages to ecosystems (e.g., acidification of
Adirondack lakes) or increased health risks (e.g., from increased con-
21. See id.
22. The argument is essentially the same as in the case of other arbitrary restrictions on
control techniques, such as technology standards.  Prior to 1990, sulfur dioxide regulation was a
classic example of a regulation resulting in higher costs than necessary.  By effectively requiring
power plants to install scrubbers (more precisely, mandating a certain percentage reduction in
emissions, which could only be met with a scrubber), regardless of the sulfur dioxide emissions
from the plant, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments limited the discretion of power plant op-
erators and raised the costs of abatement. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
23. See TIETENBERG, supra note 18, at 22.
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centrations of sulfur dioxide in urban areas).  While emissions are
closer to environmental damages than inputs, they are still somewhat
removed.  Thus, we can conceive of a series of possible levels of
regulation, from inputs, to ultimate environmental damages.  For a
pollutant that causes human health damages, for example, this chain
would run from inputs, to emissions, to ambient concentrations, to
exposure, to human health risk.  Indeed, we can also extend the ar-
gument in the other direction, viewing technology standards as one
step prior to input-based regulations.  Each step along the spectrum
from technology to environmental damages represents a possible lo-
cus of regulation.24
In some respects, the “ideal” instrument would be one that sets
environmental damage as the locus of regulation.  One can imagine a
tax based on units of habitat loss, on fish killed from water pollution,
or on the increased risk of morbidity from increased air pollution.  Of
course, administering such a tax would present insurmountable obsta-
cles—notably, the problem of how to connect a given environmental
effect with the polluter ultimately responsible.  Put another way, the
administrative costs of such a tax would outweigh the benefits from
taxing the habitat loss or morbidity risk directly.  Conceptually, how-
ever, such a tax merely occupies a different place on the same contin-
uum along which we compared instruments based on pollution and
those based on inputs.  The fundamental tradeoff remains the same:
the degree of correlation between the performance indicator and the
desired outcome (lessened environmental damage), weighed against
the administrative costs of the performance indicator chosen.  The
optimal location along the continuum—the locus of regulation—will
vary with the context.
For example, it is feasible to monitor (and thus to regulate) sul-
fur dioxide emissions from the smokestacks of power plants.  On the
other hand, most proposals for global climate change policy involve
taxes on carbon content in fuels or tradeable carbon rights, rather
than taxes or permits denominated in carbon dioxide emissions.  Such
an approach is partly justified by the close correlation between car-
bon dioxide emissions and carbon content.  At least as important,
however, are the enormous administrative costs that would be in-
volved in monitoring and taxing individual users of fossil fuels (e.g.,
automobile owners).25
24. The author credits Robert Stavins with suggesting this framework.
25. To see the importance of the administrative costs involved in regulating emissions, sup-
pose that a new “end-of-pipe” (i.e., post-combustion) technology to reduce carbon dioxide
KEOHANE_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  12:55 PM
400 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:389
The consideration of ambient permits and taxes, therefore, dem-
onstrates that Professor Richards’ discussion of the “degree of corre-
lation between the performance indicator and the desired outcome”
can be extended far beyond inputs and outputs.  In fact, the same
fundamental point applies to a whole spectrum of possible levels of
regulatory intervention, from technology, to the underlying environ-
mental damages.  Indeed, a comprehensive taxonomy would include
not only ambient permits and taxes, but also instruments tied directly
to increases in human health risk or environmental deterioration.
V.  HOW APPLICABLE IS TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS TO
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY?
Professor Richards’ most provocative argument is that transac-
tion cost economics offers important lessons for instrument choice in
environmental policy.26  After reviewing the theory of contractual ar-
rangements laid out largely by Oliver Williamson,27 Professor Ri-
chards concludes that this theory is relevant to the choice of environ-
mental policy instruments.28  In particular, he argues that instruments
(such as taxes or tradeable permits) that offer private parties more
discretion over investments in pollution control also give rise to the
possibility of regulatory opportunism.  Fears that regulators might
expropriate the gains from cost-reducing investments (e.g., by confis-
cating tradeable permits) may lead firms to under-invest in abatement
activities.29  Richards describes such distortions in firms’ decision-
making as “governance costs.”30 Since these costs are generated by
allocating discretion to private parties, he argues, they provide poten-
tial grounds for preferring direct command-and-control regulation to
market-based instruments.31
For all the originality of his argument, however, Professor Ri-
chards does not fully explain why transaction cost economics is rele-
emissions became widely available.  Such a technology would diminish the correlation between
carbon content and carbon dioxide emissions, since emissions could be reduced either by burn-
ing a fuel with lower carbon content or by installing the end-of-pipe abatement technology.
However, the enormous administrative difficulties associated with regulating at the level of in-
dividual carbon dioxide emitters would remain, preserving a preference for regulating carbon
content rather than carbon dioxide emissions.
26. See Richards, supra note 1, at 254-73.
27. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
28. See Richards, supra note 1, at 261-65.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 258.
31. See id. at 265, 278-80.
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vant to environmental policy.  Rather, he simply asserts that the “fac-
tors that are key to the analysis of transaction costs—bounded ration-
ality and opportunism on the part of the parties and asset specificity
and uncertainty in the transaction—are equally relevant to pollution
abatement programs.”32  Moreover, he implicitly embraces the prem-
ise that those characteristics are, in themselves, sufficient for the
wholesale application of transaction cost economics to environmental
policy.
In order to assess the applicability of transaction cost economics
to environmental policy, I first review the basic structure of the “hold-
up” problem at the heart of transaction cost theories, which motivates
the design of hierarchical arrangements or the long-term contracts
that mimic them.  I then ask how well the model fits pollution control
policy.  In many cases, such as the examples provided by Professor
Richards,33 there may be some potential for expropriation by regula-
tors, and resulting underinvestment by firms; but this problem is bet-
ter conceived in terms of cost revelation by firms and time-
inconsistency on the part of the regulator than as a contracting prob-
lem amenable to transaction cost analysis.  In particular, the root of
the commitment problem in environmental policy is the regulatory
relationship itself, rather than the existence of an investment in a spe-
cific asset.
I next propose a particular version of a conventional “hold-up”
problem that does apply to the context of environmental policy.
Rather than being characteristic of market-based environmental
regulation, however, this case is the result of a special assumption
about regulatory behavior.  In general, by instituting arms-length re-
lationships between firms and the regulator, maintaining an essential
anonymity among polluters, market-based instruments may tend to
mitigate, rather than create, the hold-up problem.  Further, even if we
grant Professor Richards’ claim that a hold-up problem is likely to re-
sult from market-based instruments, his proposed remedy of a form
of direct regulation such as a technology standard does not represent
a solution.
Throughout my analysis, I will consider Professor Richards’ ar-
guments within the context of a generic pollution abatement problem,
in which emissions from a polluting industry are regulated by gov-
ernment.  Because the instrument of “government production” is
32. See id. at 261-62.
33. See id. at 262-63.
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somewhat elusive in this context (unless one takes it to mean state
ownership of the industrial sector),34 I will focus on what Professor
Richards calls “direct regulation,” or technology standards—the form
of “hierarchical control” suited to pollution abatement regulation.35
A.  A Canonical Hold-Up Problem
The question motivating transaction cost theories of the firm is,
in some sense, why firms (hierarchical organizations characterized by
vertical control among agents) exist at all.  Given the well-known
theoretical efficiency of perfectly functioning markets, why are spot
market transactions insufficient?  The answer, as advanced by Oliver
Williamson in particular,36 is that three characteristics of interactions
(between firms or between agents) raise obstacles to the smooth func-
tioning of contracts: bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset
specificity.  When agents are not fully rational, and lack perfect fore-
sight, they cannot anticipate (and thus include in a contract) every
possible eventuality that will affect their relationship.  When agents
are opportunistic, they seek to further their own self-interest, even at
the expense of the other party.  And when agents invest in assets that
are specialized to the relationship, they risk being taken advantage of
ex post—being “held up”—by the other party.
Consider the following stylized version of the hold-up problem.37
Two firms, A and B, engage in a series of spot market transactions.
Firm A supplies widgets to Firm B.  Suppose that Firm A can install a
specialized widget factory tailor-made to Firm B’s needs, at some ex-
tra cost.  Suppose further that such an investment would be efficient:
the gains from specialization would outweigh the costs of the invest-
ment.  Under a system of spot-market transactions, Firm A has little
34. Indeed, one is never quite sure what Professor Richards has in mind by “government
production” in most environmental policy contexts.  His example—the National Forest sys-
tem—suggests that what Professor Richards has in mind is “government production of a public
good” (setting aside the issue of whether, in fact, the National Forests should be seen as a public
environmental good, or as a storehouse of timber for private firms).  But, the government can-
not feasibly produce the good “clean air” (at least, after-the-fact removal of emissions from the
air would, presumably, be vastly more expensive than end-of-pipe controls by emitters).  The
instrument of “government production,” therefore, appears to have little relevance for a large
body of environmental policy.
35. See Richards, supra note 1, at 264.
36. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 27.
37. For an excellent and succinct review of transactions cost theories (and related theories
of the firm), see OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 21-28
(1995).  Hart also provides his own theories about vertical control and contractual relationships,
based on a theory of complementary assets and residual rights in a firm’s production.
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incentive to make the investment, because it will not be able to re-
coup the extra investment ex post.  Once Firm A makes the invest-
ment, Firm B can exploit the bilateral relationship to extract the rents
from the investment for itself.  Having specialized to produce widgets
for Firm B, Firm A’s outside options are worse, because A’s specific
investment is of no use for the general widget market.  In such cases,
vertical relationships (or, at the least, contractual arrangements in-
corporating some features of hierarchical control) may solve the
problem by aligning the incentives of the investing firm with its part-
ner firm.
A prominent example of a potential hold-up problem and the
vertical control used as a solution is the relationship between General
Motors and Fisher Body, a long-time supplier of car bodies to the
automobile manufacturing giant.38  As Hart describes the relationship,
it was subject to a hold-up problem: if either firm made an investment
specialized to the relationship, it ran the risk that the other firm could
expropriate some of the gains from that investment ex post, without
having borne the costs.  For example, if Fisher made an investment
that allowed it to meet the specifications for GM auto bodies at a
lower cost, it would not be able to recoup all of the cost savings of
that investment.  Ex post bargaining would allow GM to negotiate a
lower price for auto bodies, taking advantage of Fisher’s investment,
which by definition did not yield cost savings in the production of
other types of auto bodies.  Thus, Fisher would have an inefficiently
low incentive to invest.
Relationships between coal mines and coal-fired power plants
provide further examples of specific investments: for example, a util-
ity can locate a power plant adjacent to a coal mine, or install boilers
dedicated to a certain type of coal.  As transaction cost theories
would predict, the duration of coal delivery contracts—a means of
avoiding repeated bargaining and, thus, mitigating potential hold-up
problems—is related to the degree of asset specificity.39
It is important to stress that the particular type of hold-up prob-
lem at issue here grows out of the relationship created by the poten-
tial for asset specificity.  The nature of the relationship between the
two agents is altered critically by the specific investment, a process
that Williamson labels the “fundamental transformation.”40  A sup-
38. See id. at 6-8, 23-27.
39. See Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical
Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987).
40. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 27, at 61.
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plier, for example, may originally be determined by competitive bid-
ding from among a number of candidates who are ex ante indistin-
guishable; but if the winning bidder then invests in specialized assets,
it gains a distinct relationship with the contractor.  In Williamson’s
terms, a “faceless” transaction in the marketplace (others use the
phrase “arms-length relationship”) has been replaced by a bilateral
situation in which the identities of buyer and supplier matter.41
Rather than being ancillary to the relationship, the specialized in-
vestment is the linchpin; its existence creates the hold-up problem
and the corresponding need for vertical integration or hierarchical
control.42
B.  Cost Revelation and the Regulatory Relationship
To illustrate the hold-up problem in environmental regulation,
Professor Richards cites two examples.  On closer examination, how-
ever, neither quite represents the type of hold-up problem envisioned
by Williamson and his colleagues.  The first example is the EPA’s
emissions trading program in the 1980s, in which “fear of expropria-
tion [of emissions permits by state agencies] likely impeded trading
and, by implication, cost-effective investment.”43  In this instance,
however, the fear of expropriation was based not on the regulator ex-
tracting the gains from a specific investment, but rather on the regula-
tor learning new information from trading behavior and using it to
ratchet up the level of regulation.  That is, the key issue was not
whether firms would make new investments to reduce their control
costs, but whether they would reveal their existing control costs by
trading emissions credits.  While the reduction in trading may have
reduced incentives for new investment, this was only an indirect effect
of the fear of regulatory opportunism.  In contrast, investment deci-
sions are fundamental to the “hold-up problem” of transaction cost
economics.
The second example cited by Professor Richards is that of the
EPA’s emissions standards for automobiles.  Citing work by Yao,
Professor Richards states that car manufacturers may underinvest in
emissions control technologies in order to boost the cost of compli-
ance and derail proposed emissions standards.44  This case, however,
again concerns revelation of cost information: car manufacturers
41. See id. at 61-62.
42. See id. at 61-63.
43. See Richards, supra note 1, at 263.
44. See id.
KEOHANE_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  12:55 PM
Spring 2000] EVALUATING INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 405
hope to inflate their costs so that the agency will choose a less strin-
gent standard.  Because the standards in question are announced in
advance, any underinvestment by the automakers cannot be the
product of fears that, once the automakers invest in emissions control
technology, the gains they might otherwise get from such investments
will be extracted by the regulator in the form of tighter standards.45
Rather than representing contracting problems due to asset
specificity and the resulting bilateral relationships, these two exam-
ples illustrate a different type of commitment problem, which I will
label a cost revelation problem: the regulator is unable to commit in
advance not to take advantage of cost information revealed by the
firm’s actions.  If the firms reveal their cost of compliance to be low,
for example, the regulator may have an incentive ex post to “ratchet
up” the stringency of regulation.  Anticipating this, the regulated
firms have a strategic incentive to distort their own behavior in order
to fool the regulator.  This type of problem has been studied exten-
sively in generalized regulatory settings, such as government pro-
curement and cost regulation of natural monopolies.46
The key distinction between this cost revelation problem and the
contracting problem envisioned in the transaction cost literature is
the nature of the relationship between the two parties.  As described
above, the core of the contracting problem in the transaction cost lit-
erature is the existence of a specialized investment, which, in effect,
creates a new relationship out of a “faceless transaction.”  On the
other hand, the cost revelation problem takes place within a relation-
ship defined by the fact of regulation.  The key element of the rela-
tionship is not the specific investment a firm makes, but the authority
relationship defined by regulatory policy:  the regulator, backed by
the State, has the authority to require the firm to carry out actions
(such as reducing its pollution) that the firm would not otherwise do.
45. There is necessarily a distinction between an investment that a firm would make with
the expectation of a future payoff and one that would simply reveal cost information about the
firm.  In the case of EPA emissions standards, a firm that made an investment after the an-
nouncement of the stricter standards might do so to comply with the new rules, but it would not
be hoping to capture savings in the costs of compliance with the old rules.  The causal motiva-
tion behind underinvestment is avoidance of an indication to the EPA that the new standard
was feasible; therefore, the firm might seek to fool the agency by not investing.  The effect—un-
derinvestment—is the same as in the hold-up problem, but this does not imply that the cause is
also the same.
46. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
REGULATION AND PROCUREMENT (1993) [hereinafter LAFFONT & TIROLE, A THEORY]; Jean-
Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Using Cost Observations to Regulate Firms, 94 J. POL. ECON. 614
(1986).
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Thus, the cost revelation problem applies equally well to the cost
regulation of electric utilities,47 where no specific asset is involved, as
to the EPA’s decisions on automobile standards.  Firms in an envi-
ronmental regulatory relationship may well make specialized invest-
ments, in the sense of pollution control investments that are not oth-
erwise productive; but such investments are not the source of the
special relationship between those firms and the regulator.  Moreo-
ver, it is the revelation of information, rather than the decision to
make a specific investment, that makes the firm vulnerable to regula-
tory opportunism.  In the case of the emissions trading program, for
example, I have argued that the question of investment is ancillary to
the more basic issue of firm trading decisions.  It is the trading deci-
sions that will reveal information and are thus distorted by the regula-
tory relationship.  The effect on investment is only secondary.
C.  Expropriation and Environmental Policy
Professor Richards’ examples may provide better illustrations of
the cost-revelation problem than the hold-up problem; nonetheless,
we can outline a hypothetical example that may capture what he has
in mind.  We can then use this example to assess Professor Richards’
conclusions about governance costs and environmental policy instru-
ments.
Suppose a regulator institutes a system of tradeable emissions
permits for some specific air pollutant.  To help distinguish the hold-
up problem from the cost-revelation problem discussed above, sup-
pose that the regulator has accurate information on polluters’ control
costs and can monitor any investments in new control technologies.
Consider a polluting firm in the regulated industry contemplating an
investment in a new abatement technology with a lower cost than its
initial technology.  Switching to the new technology will allow the
firm to abate more cheaply and to sell the resulting excess emissions
permits (or to reduce its purchases of such permits, if it is a net
buyer).48  If the benefit from doing so is greater than the cost of the
investment, a cost-minimizing firm will adopt the technology.
Once firms have made their investments, however, the regulator
can improve air quality by confiscating the excess permits of any firm
who adopted the new technology.  By doing so, the regulator would
47. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric
Utilities, 4 YALE J. OF REG.  1 (1986).
48. This is where the theory of the dynamic incentive effects of regulation, discussed ear-
lier, comes into play.  See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 9.
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extract the gains from the investment, in the form of improved envi-
ronmental quality, at the expense of the firm.  If polluters anticipate
this possibility ex ante, they will discount the gains from their invest-
ments and thus have a lower incentive to adopt new technologies.
Therefore, the regulator’s ability to respond to new investment by
tightening the stringency of regulation creates a hold-up problem.
An important aspect of this example, however, is that the basic
result—that firms will underinvest in pollution control technology if
they fear confiscation of the permits—is not robust with respect to
changes in the scenario.  The example above assumes that the regula-
tor can, for each individual firm, determine which permits were cre-
ated by the investment in technology and confiscate only those per-
mits.  Such specific action on the part of the regulator is necessary if
the regulator is to target those cost savings that are due to the invest-
ment made by the firm.  Suppose, on the contrary, that in response to
investment by firms in the industry, the regulator lowers the total
number of permits available—perhaps by lowering the total available
at auction or by reducing permit allocations to all firms by some fixed
proportion.  Will the effect on firm investment be the same?
The answer, of course, is no.  To take a simple case, assume that
the firms are each “small enough” that an individual firm’s decision to
adopt a technology has only a negligible effect on the industry-wide
marginal cost curve.  In that case, the possibility that the regulator
will reduce the number of emissions permits will actually increase the
incentive to invest in new technology.  This is because the cost savings
from such investment are positively related to the price of permits:
the more expensive it is to pollute, the greater the incentive to reduce
abatement costs.  Moreover, for any given distribution of marginal
control costs among firms, the permit price will be higher when there
are fewer permits available, simply as a result of supply and demand
in the permit market.49  Some firms that would not choose to adopt a
technology under the original number of permits will therefore have
an incentive to do so given the smaller number of permits, because
the cost savings will be higher given the higher permit price.  Thus,
investment would increase, rather than decrease, as a result of the
49. If marginal abatement costs in the polluting industry fall due to technology adoption,
then the permit price after adoption may be lower than the permit price before adoption, even if
the regulator reduces the number of permits.  In fact, we should expect such a result if the
regulator is setting the number of permits optimally (taking into account the marginal damages
function).  However, given the adoption decisions by firms, the permit price will be higher if the
regulator reduces the number of permits than it would be if the number of permits were fixed.
Thus, reduction in the number of permits will increase the firm-level investment incentive.
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regulator’s inability to commit to a constant level of permits.50  In
more general settings, the regulator’s inability to commit to a certain
level of permits, and the ex post incentive to increase the stringency of
regulation, may result either in over- or underinvestment, relative to
the commitment case.51
Meanwhile, an emissions tax provides no obvious opening for
such expropriation at all, at least not if we assume (with Professor Ri-
chards) that the regulator is motivated by economic efficiency.  The
optimal Pigouvian tax in any setting is equal to the marginal damage
from pollution at the efficient level of pollution.52  If marginal dam-
ages are constant, the optimal tax is also constant, regardless of the
polluting industry’s marginal costs of abatement.  If marginal dam-
ages are increasing per unit of pollution (i.e., marginal benefits of
abatement are decreasing), a decrease in marginal abatement cost de-
creases the optimal tax.  The scope for expropriation of the gains from
investment is therefore limited, since the regulator’s optimal response
to investments in cost-reducing technology is either to keep the tax
the same or to lower it.  Moreover, the same result holds in the con-
text of cost-effectiveness rather than efficiency—i.e., if the regulator
seeks to achieve a given level of pollution control at least cost.  The
tax required to achieve a given target will fall with the marginal con-
trol costs.
Therefore, the hold-up problem described above depends cru-
cially on both the instrument chosen (emissions permits rather than
an emissions tax) and the manner in which the regulator employs it
(confiscating the permits of specific firms, rather than reducing the to-
tal number of permits available).  For the analogy with the transac-
tion cost literature to hold, the regulator must confiscate the permits
in a targeted fashion.  The regulator must distinguish among polluters
and treat them differently according to their investment decisions.  In
other words, the relationship between each polluting firm and the
50. In a sense, the firms face a collective action problem: as a whole, and the industry
would be better off with more permits rather than fewer—but any individual firm, with a negli-
gible effect on the regulator’s decision, is better off adopting the technology than not. See gener-
ally Nathaniel O. Keohane, Policy Instruments and the Diffusion of Pollution Abatement Tech-
nology (1999) (unpublished manuscript, Harvard University) (on file with author).
51. See generally Gary Biglaiser, et. al., Dynamic Pollution Regulation, 8 J. REG. ECON. 33
(1995); Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies, 62 J.
PUB. ECON. 85 (1996).
52. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 14, at 45.  The notion of a corrective tax on pollu-
tion is generally credited to Pigou. See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (1920).
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regulator is determined by the investment decisions of that particular
firm.
The guiding principle of market-based instruments such as emis-
sions taxes or tradeable permits, however, is that they harness the
power of the market to allocate pollution control responsibilities effi-
ciently.  Their crucial advantage derives from their institution of
“arms-length” relationships between firms and the regulator.  No firm
has specific pollution abatement responsibilities assigned to it by the
regulator.  Instead, each firm makes its own choices based on a price
signal (a tax or permit price) applicable to all polluters.  The regulator
makes no distinctions among firms, instead charging them all equally
per unit of pollution or ensuring that their emissions do not exceed
their permit holdings.53
A hold-up problem, by contrast, requires that the regulator’s
treatment of polluters depend not just on their emissions, but also on
their investment decisions.  Thus, the arms-length relationships char-
acteristic of market-based instruments are at odds with the necessary
conditions for the hold-up problem.  Of course, as our hypothetical
example suggests, one can imagine regulatory opportunism in combi-
nation with market-based instruments.  However, such opportunism
is hardly integral to such instruments, as Professor Richards seems to
suggest.54  If anything, the regulator–firm relationship required for the
hold-up problem is fundamentally antithetical to the decentralized
structure of market-based instruments.
D.  Would Direct Regulation Solve the Problem?
Professor Richards, having argued that a hold-up problem exists
with market-based instruments, proposes that direct regulation—in
particular, technology standards—could solve the problem.  In the
preceding section, we showed that only under special assumptions will
a market-based instrument create the hold-up problem he envisions.
In this section, we ask whether technology standards would fare any
better, even granting the existence of a hold-up problem for market-
based instruments.
Under a pure technology standard, the regulator requires each
polluting firm to install a particular technology.  As Professor Ri-
53. In the case of ambient taxes or permits, discussed supra Part IV, the regulator does dis-
tinguish among firms based on their locations.  But the principle of “arms-length” relationships
remains, since the rule used to distinguish among firms is a general one, and (once a firm has
chosen a location) does not depend on a firm’s actions.
54. See Richards, supra note 1, at 265, 278-80.
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chards argues, this is tantamount to hierarchical government control
over pollution abatement decisions.  Because hierarchical arrange-
ments have been suggested as solutions to the contracting problems
studied in the transaction cost literature, Professor Richards con-
cludes that they are also the solution in the environmental policy
arena.55  However, he never spells out how direct control of abate-
ment technology would alleviate the hold-up problem he perceives.56
We consider three possible arguments in turn.
One argument might be that under a technology standard, a firm
does not earn cost savings from adopting a new technology, since
there is a zero price on emissions.  Moreover, the regulator obviously
cannot expropriate cost savings that do not exist.  Nonetheless, the
proper solution by the regulator to rent extraction can hardly be to
eliminate those rents altogether.  To remove the distortionary effects
on firms’ decisions by preventing them from making those decisions
may dispose of the hold-up problem, narrowly defined, but it does not
advance the underlying goal of encouraging efficient investment deci-
sions.  What would be the reason, in this case, to suppose that the
regulator’s choice of technology would be any better than the firm’s
choice, even given the distortionary effects of the hold-up problem?
The usual tradeoff between “high-powered incentives” and rent ex-
traction in regulation, which Professor Richards alludes to, does not
bear on the choice between market-based instruments and direct
regulation.57  The former tradeoff involves the choice between the
regulator’s desire to extract rents (e.g., to prevent “windfall profits”)
and the regulator’s desire to create incentives for cost-reducing inno-
vation by the firm.58  These objectives conflict with one another, be-
cause the prospect of rents provides the firm with the incentive to re-
duce costs.  In the case of pollution control, however, high-powered
incentives and the potential for rent extraction are both products of
market-based instruments.  Direct regulation would eliminate the op-
portunity for rent extraction, but it would also eliminate the incen-
tives for cost reduction.
55. See Richards, supra note 1, at 265.
56. Similarly, the transaction cost literature has itself been criticized for being vague on
precisely why vertical integration should solve the hold-up problem. See HART, supra note 37, at
27.
57. See Richards, supra note 1, at 267.
58. See generally LAFFONT & TIROLE, A THEORY, supra note 47; Joskow & Schmalensee,
supra note 46.
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A second justification for technology standards relates to
“adaptability.”  Professor Richards argues that “the government may
want to employ government production or direct regulation if it an-
ticipates the need to adapt its environmental programs to changes in
information or changes in goals.”59  But Professor Richards fails to
explain why a technology standard (a form of “direct regulation”)
would be more flexible than a tax or a tradeable permit system.  A
technology standard for new sources might well be flexible, in the
sense that a change from requiring technology A to be installed in
new sources to mandating technology B can be made with negligible
impact on existing polluters.  A change in a tax or tradeable permit
system, on the other hand, will presumably affect all polluters, not
just new sources, and therefore has a greater effect on the technology
decisions of existing firms.
However, this type of flexibility does not imply a corresponding
flexibility in response to changes in the regulator’s goals.  Those
goals, after all, are defined not by the type of technology being in-
stalled in new sources, but by the overall level of pollution.  Professor
Richards’ original cost-minimization problem, after all, includes the
“pollution abatement requirement” as a key constraint.  The natural
extension of a pollution abatement requirement to a setting in which
new sources appear is a target level of overall pollution emissions.60
The policy goal is thus reasonably assumed to be a level of pollution
emissions, rather than a distribution of technologies.  Indeed, the lat-
ter goal has no direct relevance for net social benefits, except to the
extent that it influences the ultimate level of pollution.61
When we recall that the ultimate goal of pollution control policy
is some target level of pollution, the apparent flexibility of technology
standards vanishes.  If the regulator wishes to reduce pollution, it will
not be sufficient, in general, to change technology requirements for
new sources:  the technologies used by existing sources will have to
change as well.  Given that fact, then, technology standards offer no
greater “adaptability” than other policy instruments.  In fact, tech-
nology standards are less flexible than other instruments, because the
59. Richards, supra note 1, at 264.
60. That is, a fixed level of pollution abatement will result in greater overall pollution emis-
sions if the number of sources of pollution grows.  Of course, a regulator might well take such
economic growth into account in determining the desired level of pollution at different points in
time.
61. As discussed supra Part IV, the ultimate goal is presumably in terms of environmental
quality.  The distinction may be important when pollution from different sources is nonuni-
formly mixed.
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choice of abatement technology is dictated by the regulator, rather
than left to the discretion of individual firms.
A third possible argument for why technology standards might
alleviate the hold-up problem is that hierarchical control arrange-
ments tend to align the interests of the two parties in the hold-up rela-
tionship.  This type of argument is a plausible justification for vertical
control and hierarchical arrangements in the traditional setting of
transaction cost economics.  For example, in the case of GM and
Fisher Body described above, the merger of the two companies brings
the interests of the management of Fisher Body in line with the inter-
ests of GM, since the former is subordinated to the latter.  As a result,
the hold-up problem may be alleviated, since GM no longer needs to
worry that Fisher Body may try to take advantage of GM’s invest-
ments in using Fisher auto bodies; similarly, the gains to specialization
by Fisher Body will now be captured by the entity which bears the
costs of investment (that is, the merged firm).
However, it is difficult to see how such a benefit might emerge
from technology standards.  Even if the regulator dictates the pollu-
tion control technology to be used by a firm, the firm still bears the
cost of buying that technology.  The regulator thus lacks any incentive
to ensure that the technology is cost-effective.  Establishing this form
of “hierarchical control” does not align the interests of the regulator
with those of the polluting firm.  Those interests would seem to be
fully aligned only under state ownership of the polluting industry,
which seems a rather extravagant solution to the hold-up problem—
especially given the doubts raised earlier about whether the hold-up
problem even exists in the environmental arena.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Professor Richards has advanced a taxonomy of environmental
policy instruments that ably demonstrates a range of possible connec-
tions among the various forms of regulatory policy—from direct
regulation such as technology standards to market-based instruments
such as emissions taxes.  However, his effort to use the taxonomy as a
basis for comparing and evaluating the instruments is subject to sev-
eral criticisms.
First, he employs a static cost-minimization problem, rather than
a dynamic one.  Of course, Professor Richards touches on the dy-
namic effects of policy instruments throughout his article—in par-
ticular, dynamic effects are implicit in the discussion of investment
decisions and regulatory opportunism.  Explicitly incorporating the
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time dimension into the framing of the regulator’s objective problem
would give his taxonomy a more coherent logical structure.  Moreo-
ver, a focus on the time dimension suggests a few new points, such as
the possibility that political and legal constraints evolve over time,
possibly as a function of the “stock” of accumulated knowledge and
experience.
Second, Professor Richards blurs the distinction between emis-
sions payments—transfers from polluters to the regulator under in-
struments such as auctioned tradeable permits and emissions taxes—
and the environmental damages from pollution.  Emissions payments
need not be equal to environmental damages.  More fundamentally,
emissions payments are best viewed as a means of achieving effi-
ciency, rather than distributional equity.  Indeed, compensation to
victims of pollution is outside the scope of the efficient solution to the
pollution externality, and—like any other form of government redis-
tribution—comes at some cost in terms of deadweight loss.  Moreo-
ver, victim compensation is incompatible with “revenue recycling,”
which is necessary to minimize the distortionary effects of environ-
mental regulation in the presence of pre-existing tax distortions.
Third, Professor Richards overlooks an important class of policy
instruments:  ambient taxes and permits, which attach a price directly
to increased pollution concentrations, rather than to the precursor of
those concentrations—pollution emissions.  The relationship between
ambient permits or taxes, and emissions permits or taxes, is exactly
parallel to that between an emissions standard and an input standard.
In both cases, the instruments being compared occupy different
points along the spectrum of the “locus of regulation.”  The ultimate
goal of environmental policy is to reduce environmental damages,
whether in the form of deterioration of environmental quality or in
the form of increased human health risk.  In theory, policy instru-
ments could be designed to be contingent upon increased cancer risk
in a population, resulting, say, from a given firm’s pollution emissions.
Such an instrument is not used in practice not because it is inconceiv-
able, but because there are enormous practical obstacles to imple-
menting it—foremost among them the difficulty of connecting the
emissions of a given source to the actual increased health risk in the
population.
The choice between regulating emissions and regulating contri-
butions to ambient concentrations involves weighing the benefits of
the latter approach (a closer correlation between the object of regula-
tion and the environmental outcome) against its costs (the adminis-
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trative difficulties inherent in attributing ambient concentrations to
specific sources).  The same tradeoff applies to the choice between
regulating emissions and regulating inputs, as in the case of carbon
dioxide.  Thus, the choice between using inputs or outputs as the
“performance indicator” for assessing compliance with environmental
regulation can be viewed within the larger context of choosing the lo-
cus of regulation:  that decision of where regulatory intervention
should be established along the chain from the control technology
and the inputs used in production all the way to environmental im-
pacts.
Fourth, Professor Richards attempts to apply the lessons of
transaction cost economics to the realm of environmental policy.  The
examples of hold-up problems that he offers, however, are better seen
as examples of cost-revelation problems in which the regulated firms
distort their behavior in order to hide information about their true
costs from the regulator.  The relationship between the government
and the firm in environmental regulation is defined by the fact of
regulation, rather than by the existence of a specialized asset (as in
the transaction cost literature).  While we can conceive of a hold-up
problem in environmental regulation, it requires the special assump-
tion that the regulator distinguishes among firms on the basis of their
investment.  Such an arrangement runs counter to the spirit of mar-
ket-based instruments, which preserve a kind of anonymity among
regulated firms.  Thus, the very nature of market-based instruments
will tend to mitigate the hold-up problem.  Finally, even if we grant
the existence of a hold-up problem under some forms of incentive-
based regulation, there is no reason to suppose that a technology
standard will fare any better.  On balance, therefore, transaction cost
economics is only of limited applicability to environmental policy.
More importantly, it does not provide a sound basis for choosing
among policy instruments.  “Governance costs” do not offer a reason
to prefer command-and-control regulation to market-based instru-
ments.
Ultimately, the primary contribution of Professor Richards’ arti-
cle is to elucidate the relationships among various instruments and to
point out some connections that have been overlooked, such as the
dual relationship between subsidies and contracts mirroring that be-
tween emissions taxes and permits.  Richards’ discussion, however,
adds little to what we already know about choosing among policy in-
struments.
